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1.  Introduction 
  Fiscal federalism increasingly places decentralised levels of government at the heart of 
its analyses (Oates, 2005). The emphasis is no longer simply on financial relations but also on 
the stability and self-enforcing properties of the institutional structures of government 
(Weingast, 1995). In particular, the constitutional setting has become a relevant and necessary 
dimension of public finance (Buchanan, 1990). In this context, the issue of devolution 
concerns both federations confronted with creeping centralisation, and unitary states in search 
of a more efficient assignment of prerogatives (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Josselin and 
Marciano, 2004). The present article intends to describe and assess a case study of devolution 
in a unitary state. 
The implementation of devolution in a unitary state is the prerogative of the central 
government, which does not prevent a significant level of decentralisation and competition 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1981; Salmon, 2000). Such is certainly the case of France and its two 
"Decentralisation Acts" of 1982 and 2004-2008. Concurrently, the local public sector has 
soon felt concerned about the preservation of its financial autonomy, hence the temptation of 
a constitutional safeguard. 
  The aim of the article is to show that this constitutional safeguard may in the future 
turn out to be counterproductive. In order to demonstrate it, we first provide an overview of 
the constitutional reform of March 2003 (section 2). We then consider the evolution of the 
autonomy of the local public sector for a given perimeter of competencies. The corresponding 
section 3 thus mainly deals with the assessment of the local power to tax in the static setting 
of a given allocation of prerogatives among levels of government. Section 4 uses a dynamic 
setting in which the perimeter of local competencies is or will be extended through the 
devolution process. It then assesses the impact of tax reform and tax sharing on local 
autonomy. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The constitutional reform of March 2003: an overview 
  The 14 December 1789 law establishes the communes as the primary level of 
government. This basic administrative structure mirrors the 44 000 parishes of that time. The 
revolutionary debates are nevertheless quite significant of the ongoing discussions. According 3
to the 1789 law, the role of municipalities is twofold. They first have autonomous tasks to 
perform; they concurrently act as the agents of their common principal, the central state. This 
tension between the municipality-principal on its land and the municipality-agent of the centre 
is in principle eased with the 1958 constitution, which guarantees that the "free 
administration" of local communities is a constitutional statement. As we will see below, the 
latter turns out to be ineffective. 
From the 1990s on, begins a period of constitutional reforms on various aspects of 
public life (there are 11 revisions between 1991 and 2003). Among them, Article 72.2 of the 
Constitution (Constitutional law n° 2003-276, 28
th of March 2003) explicitly specifies three 
financial safeguards for the local public sector: tax autonomy; compensation for devolved 
competencies; equalisation. The first principle is meant to prevent the erosion of the local 
power to tax. The second one intends to provide compensations for the financing of 
prerogatives reassigned from the central government to the local level. In other words, the 
conditions of implementation of downwards subsidiarity are given a constitutional status. This 
is also the case with the third principle, since horizontal equity is now stated as an explicit 
objective. 
  If we leave out the objective of equalisation (Gilbert and Guengant, 2004), the other 
two goals of the constitutional reform are closely related to the reassignment of prerogatives 
towards lower levels of government. The first one consists in bending or even breaking a 
trend. National grants have progressively taken too much weight relatively to local taxation. 
Since the 1980s, reductions in local tax bases (e.g. the local business tax) or even the 
suppression of taxes (e.g. the taxes on vehicles for the départements) have been only partially 
compensated for by the central government. The ensuing fiscal centralisation cannot be 
prevented by the standard legislative game. Despite the widespread practice of concurrent 
political mandates, the lobbying power of the local public sector is not sufficient, hence the 
recourse to the constitutional level. 
  The second objective is to prevent excessive budgetary tensions at the local level 
during the decentralisation process. The reassignment of prerogatives during the "First Act" of 
decentralisation (1982-1983) implies an increase in expenditures that has not been fully 
compensated by national grants. Associated with stable or decreasing tax bases, the risk of 
unbalance has been reinforced by limits to tax rates increases (legal limits and, to a lesser and 
mitigate extent, competitive limits). In the perspective of the "Second Act" (2004-2008), the 
constitutional guarantee is meant to ensure balanced compensations for the transfers of 
prerogatives, preferably through taxation rather than by way of grants. 4
The following sections provide a closer look at the two objectives of tax autonomy and 
compensation for devolved tasks. Tax autonomy is first discussed for a given perimeter of 
competencies: Will the constitutional provision give an adequate safeguard against the 
centralisation of public finance? Second, while decentralisation endogenizes the set of 
prerogatives of local governments, it does not necessarily provide the right amount of 
resources, and the right resources to finance devolution. 
 
3.  Static assessment: constitutional safeguards for the local power to tax 
The constitutional guarantee of tax autonomy is interpreted by an organic law (n° 2004-
758, 29
th of July, 2004) which provides an explicit measure of reference for each group of 
local governments, namely the communes, départements, and régions.
3.1. Providing a constitutional guarantee of tax autonomy…
The operational principle is that the proportion of proper or distinctive resources must 
not be lower than a "decisive share" (part déterminante) of total resources. Now, the share of 
proper resources has been steadily decreasing in the recent past (see table 1). The trend is 
broken at the observed level in 2003. The references thus become 55.97% for the communes,
57.40% for the départements, and 36.07% for the régions. The organic law defines proper 
resources as those revenues directly controlled by the local assemblies. Grants and subsidies 
are thus non autonomous resources and the constitutional norm intends to stop their relative 
growth. User charges and tax revenues are obviously proper resources. If we concentrate on 
the latter, their local control is dependent on two variables, the tax rate and the tax base. 
[Insert table 1] 
  At first glance, the local power to tax primarily rests on the vote of rates. In legal 
terms, this vote is a unilateral administrative act the effect of which is immediate and certain. 
Indeed, the central government bears the risk of tax collection. The main limitations come 
from the imposed links between rates and from the existence of upper bounds. The local 
power to tax is also dependent on the tax base effect. Local public policies do influence the 
location of individuals and firms. Services and taxes are then likely to be partially capitalised 
into base values. Contrary to the tax rate, the tax base effect is nonetheless uncertain and 
usually not immediate. The organic law does not specify that the base be sensitive to local 
public policies. That may in a way threaten tax autonomy whenever the impact of policies is 
not reflected in tax bases. 5
An illustration of this threat is the sharing of national taxes among different levels of 
government. As transfers of competencies are growing and since local tax bases (or local 
taxes themselves) are shrinking, the central government may be tempted to share fiscal 
resources whose base has no connection with local public decisions. The organic law 
considers this revenue as a proper one, which excessively enlarges the field of proper 
resources. Nevertheless, the organic law provides an imperfect but real safeguard to the 
erosion of tax autonomy. It is also an answer to the difficulties to reform local public finance 
these last twenty years. 
 
3.2. …In order to stop the decline in local taxation
The constitutional guarantee may not have been necessary, had the reform of the local 
tax system been conducted properly. Conversely, the measures which have indeed been 
implemented have mostly contributed to a centralisation of public finance. The appeal of the 
local public sector to the higher norm intends to fight against both the cost of non reform and 
the centralising effects of implicit reform. Over the last few years, the central government has 
suppressed local taxes like the regional housing tax, the property tax on agricultural land for 
the départements and the regions. The base of the local business tax has also been reduced by 
removing wages from its calculus. All those expedients mostly derive from the failure to 
reform the system of local taxation, which proves to be more and more unequal and 
inefficient. The central government progressively bears an increasing part of the burden of 
local contributions, which are thus transferred to national taxpayers. In 2004, the central 
government is the first local taxpayer, financing half the local business tax, one-third of the 
housing tax and of the property tax on land. Only the property tax on buildings remains a 
local one for most of it (see figure 1). 
[Insert figure 1] 
  What is the constitutional safeguard with regard to that situation? Before answering 
the question one must distinguish between two forms of tax compensations. First, legislative 
tax relieves (dégrèvements législatifs) are decided by parliament. They do not influence the 
tax base and hence not the local fiscal revenue. Individuals or firms are relieved of a part of 
their contribution, which is paid for by the national budget. For the local government, the 
operation is neutral and preserves its fiscal capability. Second, tax exemptions (exonérations)
do reduce the tax base, which by the way further disconnects local public policies from tax 
revenues. 
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Compensations by the national budget for tax exemptions (exonérations) usually take 
the form of grants, or are included in an existing grant. Contrary to what happens with 
legislative tax relieves, this mechanism of compensation is often partial and submitted to 
unbalanced negotiations between the local public sector and the central government. For 
example, the compensating grant for the local business tax is the adjustment variable of the 
contractual agreement governing fiscal relations between the local and national levels. It has 
been substantially shrinking over the last few years. The organic law explicitly rules out 
grants for tax exemptions from the field of proper resources, thereby claiming the importance 
of tax control by local assemblies. In this respect, the constitutional guarantee is effective. 
  This effectiveness does not solve all the problems associated with tax compensations. 
Legislative tax relieves implicitly change the nature of local taxation. If we take the example 
of the housing tax (a similar mechanism is at work for the local business tax), the actual 
contribution of a household is limited by a ceiling which depends on income for contributors 
whose revenue is below a given threshold. The difference is accounted for by the national 
budget. This system de facto implies that the housing tax gets closer and closer to a national 
income tax, in particular for half of the households from urban areas (Fréville, 2003). 
Expensive and centralising: the evolution of the system of local taxation induces a significant 
cost for a national budget already tightened by excessive borrowing and deficit. It also 
decreases local autonomy whenever grants compensate suppressed or reduced local tax bases. 
The recourse to the constitutional level has been somewhat efficient by defining the proper 
resources of the local public sector. It has also acknowledged the failure of the legislative 
process in reforming public finance. 
 
4.  Dynamic assessment: the ongoing devolution and the extension of the 
perimeter of competencies 
The First Act of decentralisation of March 1982 significantly changes the assignment of 
prerogatives between the national government and the local public sector. However, the 
following twenty years evidence an increasing discrepancy between transfers of competencies 
and transfers of financial means. Anticipating similar difficulties for the Second Act of 
decentralisation, the constitutional reform intends to prevent or at least cover the risk of 
excessive deficit for the local public sector. 
 7
4.1. Devolution and the risk of budget deficit
The First Act reassigns competencies to the départements: social assistance (but not 
social security), the building and maintenance of first stage secondary schools (collèges, for 
pupils aged 11-14) and school transports. The régions are assigned the building and 
maintenance of second stage secondary schools (lycées, for pupils aged 15-18) and 
professional training. For each transferred competence, the reference is the national budget 
expenditure for this item during the previous year. The year of the transfer, half of this 
amount is covered by reassigned taxes (for the départements: registration fees for legal 
transactions and a tax on vehicles; For the régions: another tax on vehicles). The second half 
consists in grants, one for current expenditures, other ones for investment. In 1986, total 
compensations amount to 4.1 billions € for the départements and 1 billion € for the régions.
After the first year of the transfer, the respective evolutions of expenditures and 
revenues no longer match. Many investments are less strategic and optional decisions than 
they are more pragmatically necessary conditions for maintaining the quality of public 
services. This is particularly the case with the renovation and modernisation of collèges and 
lycées. In this respect, grants follow a national indexing and they prove to be relatively 
inelastic, with the exception of VAT compensations. Concurrently, the devolved taxes bring a 
limited and fluctuating fiscal capacity. Departmental and regional assemblies then 
progressively shift a large part of the burden on the property, housing and local business 
taxes. 
[Insert figure 2] 
  Figure 2 describes the evolution of transfers from the central government to the local 
public sector for the period of the First Act of decentralisation (earlier, there had been a first 
stage of devolution of social assistance to the départements). On the whole period 1979-2003, 
there is indeed a growing discrepancy between the transferred resources and the expenditures 
generated by devolution. The ambiguity of the process is that once prerogatives are devolved, 
the spending decisions depend both on structural outlays (for example, security requirements 
will cost a lot more than anticipated, particularly in the 1990s) and on strategic decisions (e.g. 
developing or not public school transportation). It is not easy to disentangle those two 
dimensions of expenditures. 
  During a first period (1984-1989), the situation remains relatively balanced. Increasing 
expenditures associated with depressed bases for the transferred taxes worsen the situation 
during the next period (1990-1995). The last period (1996-2003) shows a stabilisation of the 
situation. The suppression of one of the transferred taxes (the departmental tax on vehicles) is 8
compensated by a grant, which threatens tax autonomy if not budget balance. The evolution 
of expenditures is kept in rhythm with tax returns, but the reverse may also be true as tax 
returns may determine expenditures. 
  The announcement of a new and ambitious stage of decentralisation soon prompts the 
debates on compensation. About 13 billions € are to be transferred, and the local public sector 
would like to get assurances that the disequilibrium evidenced by figure 2 will be avoided in 
the future. Since the legislative game is not necessarily viewed as an efficient safeguard, local 
politicians (or the "local part" of national politicians) have recourse to the higher 
constitutional level. 
 
4.2. Constitutional safeguards and the coverage of the risk of deficit
The Second Act broadens the perimeter of competencies by transferring prerogatives 
from the central to the local level, particularly at the departmental and regional levels. In 
2004, the reform concerns the minimum income RMI (for the départements). From 2005 to 
2008, the fields of economic development, professional training, social assistance, health, 
environment and culture will see many of their public policy prerogatives decentralised. First 
estimates evaluate the corresponding yearly expenditures to 3 billions € for the régions, 8.7
billions € for the départements. The reform also concerns civil servants of the education (96 
000 administrative and technical staff) and transport and infrastructure (33 000 employees) 
sectors. They will be paid and administered by local governments. In this quite revolutionary 
context, the constitutional reform intends to prevent the risk of excessive budgetary tensions 
for the local public sector. 
  The first step is the constitutionalisation of the compensation for the devolved 
prerogatives. According to Article 72.2, any transfer of competencies from the state to the 
local public sector is associated with an allocation of resources equivalent to those previously 
required at the national level. That guarantee provides an instantaneous safeguard for the first 
year of devolution: It states that a legislative act will provide resources whenever the 
extension of the perimeter of competencies implies an increase in expenditures. The 
constitutional provision helps avoid situations in which the local public sector would be 
granted prerogatives… and left with the task of finding the money for financing it. 
  The guarantee does work for the first year(s). However, once the competence has been 
devolved, local governments may have to face a possible discrepancy between the 
expenditures involved by the new prerogatives (think of the minimum income if 
unemployment suddenly increases) and their budgetary capacity if the latter is ill-designed or 9
at least not enough responsive. In this respect, the constitutional principle of tax autonomy is 
meant to serve as an indirect but effective safeguard. Since proper resources must cover a 
"decisive share" of total resources, any preponderant financing by grants would automatically 
decrease the ratio of proper resources below the level required by the organic law following 
Article 72.2. The Constitutional Council could not but declare the compensation 
unconstitutional. 
  It follows quite logically that the main source of compensation should come from the 
transfer of taxes or from a proportion of shared taxes. Let us see how this principle is 
implemented. The compensation for devolved prerogatives is mainly financed by the 
allocation of tax revenues in the framework of the Loi de finances (the law describing the 
national budget on an annual basis). A complementary source of financing is provided by the 
Dotation Globale de Décentralisation (decentralisation overall grant). More specifically, the 
départements will get a non adjustable share of the TIPP (interior tax on oil products). They 
will also be granted a special tax on insurance contracts which they will have the capacity to 
modulate. As to the regions, they too will get a share of the TIPP, and we will turn to them 
later. 
  In 2004, first year of the reform, each départment receives a share of the TIPP which 
strictly compensates devolved expenditures. The following years, the current tax revenue of 
the TIPP will serve as the basis for calculating the share of each départment, according to a 
fraction initially fixed. In this setting, the tax revenue of a départment will depend on the 
national yield of the tax, and consequently on the national tax base. The disconnection with 
local rates or bases is complete. The local governments will not have any control on the tax 
revenue, either through rate effects or through base effects. The departmental share of the 
TIPP thus much more amounts to a grant secured with a national tax than to a local tax or 
even to a shared tax since there are no local rates as such. At best, it is the revenue of the tax 
that is shared, but without any control (through rates or bases) by the local government. All 
this seems quite far from the definition of proper resources, but can be illuminated through a 
“public choice” explanation. 
  The new compensation for the transfer of the minimum income RMI competence has 
been decided after the adoption of the constitutional reform, but before the writing of the 
organic law. Under a strict interpretation of Article 72.2, this mode of financing would have 
been declared unconstitutional. It would at the same time have threatened the future of the 
Second Act of decentralisation. The organic law extends - stretches - the definition of proper 
resources by including "taxes of which law determines, for each community, the rate". In the 10
present case, the base is national. The allocation of the revenue among the départments is 
interpreted as the distribution of implicit local rates applied to the national base, or as the local 
sharing of a rate applied to that national base. Under the pressure of the government, the 
organic law thus weakens the constitutional guarantee of tax autonomy by providing an 
extensive and quite inaccurate acceptation of proper resources. For all that, it does not give a 
better protection against the risk of budget disequilibrium. On the expenditure side, the 
evolution of the level of the minimum income RMI and of the number of individuals who are 
eligible to it depends on factors that the départements do not really control. Parliament keeps 
deciding on those two variables, under the constraints of macroeconomic performances and 
political considerations. 
  As to the régions, they receive in 2005 a non adjustable share of the TIPP. However, 
from 2006 onwards, the tax base will become regional. Furthermore, after 2007 and if the EU 
accepts it, the régions will have the capacity to modulate the national rate (with lower and 
upper bounds). The regional TIPP will become a real "proper resource". The risk of unbalance 
will nevertheless remain, from both the expenditure and the revenue side. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
  In a unitary state, the reform of local public finance is normally the task of the national 
legislature. Since parliament has failed to achieve it, the recourse to the constitutional level 
can be interpreted as the search for a judicially secured stability. What was up to now mostly 
settled in parliament may henceforth end up before the constitutional court. Perhaps the loose 
formulation of "free administration" in the 1958 constitution did not provide enough 
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Table 1: Fiscal autonomy of the local public sector 
 
Table 1a: Municipalities and co-operation structures (communes et groupements) 
Billion euros or % (line g) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total revenue 
(a)  78.83 83.35 86.07 89.61 92.08 96.59 





71.74 75.21 77.46 81.07 83.63 87.56 
Tax revenue 















61.53% 59.58% 58.91% 57.48% 56.56% 55.97% 




Table 1b: Intermediate level of local government (départements)
Billion euros or % (line g) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total revenue 
(a)  36.41 37.96 38.00 38.96 42.43 45.69 





33.30 34.91 35.09 35.45 38.14 41.06 
Tax revenue 















67.18% 64.19% 63.38% 60.90% 58.42% 57.40% 




Table 1c: Higher level of local government (régions)
Billion euros or % (line g) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total revenue 
(a)  12.12 12.69 12.97 13.71 16.35 17.19 





10.99 11.55 11.61 11.94 13.95 14.47 
Tax revenue 















59.87% 50.30% 51.94% 43.88% 38.06% 36.07% 
Source: our calculations from data of Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales and Direction Générale de la 
Comptabilité Publique 
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Local business tax Property tax (buildings) Housing tax Property tax (land)  
Source: our calculations from data of Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales and Direction Générale de la 
Comptabilité Publique 
 
Figure 2: Transfers from central government to local public sector







1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 199
4
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Transferred grants plus participation to social programs Transferred taxes
Total transferred resources Total of expenditures associated with devoled compentencies   
Source: our calculations from data of Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales and Direction Générale de la 
Comptabilité Publique 